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ABSTRACT

In the decades that followed World War II, the Japanese economy grew at a surprising
rate, placing the nation among the ranks of the most developed in the world.
Nonetheless, women – particularly married women – were largely confined to positions
outside of the labor market due to traditional gender norms and subsequent lack of
opportunities. While the absence of half of the Japanese population was negligible in
eras of high growth, it is no longer a healthy option for an aging Japanese economy that
has been struggling with deflation for fifteen years. Structural reform is needed, and
more women must be invited to be active participants in the labor market. This paper
studies the status quo of female labor force participation in Japan and compares its
family policy, taxation, and flexible working arrangements to those of Sweden and the
United States to draw meaningful policy recommendations for Japan. It is clear that
Japanese policy falls short of correcting existing gender norms and policy must be
reformed so that it reflects a more egalitarian stance.
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1. Introduction
At the Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum in 2014, Japanese Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe presented an overview of his program for economic reform,
known as Abenomics. Abenomics aims to lift Japan out of chronic deflation and ensure
long-term economic growth through the workings of “three arrows”: monetary easing,
fiscal stimulus, and structural reform. As part of structural reform, Prime Minister Abe
hopes to integrate more women into the Japanese labor force. His goals include
increasing female representation in leadership, increasing female labor force
participation, and increasing the percentage of women returning to work after childbirth.
Thus far, female labor force participation in Japan has risen since the introduction of
Prime Minister Abe’s reforms (Tahara-Stubbs, 2015). Nevertheless, there is
widespread skepticism about the efficacy of Abenomics – largely because the increases
in female labor force participation are in part-time employment as opposed to full-time
employment (Ganelli, 2014).
Given Japan’s commitment to greater gender equality in the workplace,
research on policies affecting female labor force participation is timely and important.
The purpose of this paper is to conduct an international comparison of policies affecting
female labor force participation and to identify policy recommendations for Japan. To
briefly summarize the key findings of the study, Japan can increase its female labor
force participation by providing more generous family support policy, eliminating
provisions in the tax code that subordinate spouses, and addressing the lifetime
employment system.
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2. Background
2.1 Japan consistently lag behinds other developed countries in terms of gender equality
in the workplace
Japan has consistently lagged behind other developed nations in terms of gender
equality in the workplace. Below are indicators of such gender inequality.
Japan’s female labor force participation rate in comparison to OECD countries
According to OECD data from 2013, Japan’s female labor force participation
rate was 71.3%, falling behind a majority of the G-7 nations. Sweden, on the other hand,
leads the group with female labor force participation rate of 80.7%. Another anomaly
is the United States, which has a female labor force participation rate of 70.6%, falling
behind its reputation as a world leader.
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Figure 1: Female Labor Force Participation Rate of 16 OECD Countries, 2013 (Source:
OECD Database)
While the numbers are different, the World Bank and International Labor
Organization data demonstrate a similar trend. Japan’s female labor force participation
2

lags behind that of other developed nations at 48.9%. This number is particularly
startling, reflecting the participation of less than half of the female working age
population of Japan.
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Figure 2: Female Labor Force Participation Rate of 16 OECD Countries, 2013 (Source:
International Labor Organization Database)
It is important to discuss the discrepancies between the data from the OECD and the
World Bank and the International Labor Organization. The differences in the female
labor force participation rates were a result of divergent definitions for various
indicators. Both organizations have the same definition for female labor force
participation rate: “labor force divided by the total working age population.” Thus, it
appears that the OECD and ILO have different underlying population data. The
definitions for other indicators required for the calculation of the female labor force
participation rate for the OECD are as follows:
a. Total population – all nationals present in, or temporarily absent from a
country, and aliens permanently settled in a country. For 2012, the total population of
Japan was 128 million. 2012 is the most recent year for which total population data is
3

available for the OECD. The total population of women for the same year was 65
million.
b. Working age population – those aged 15 to 64. The OECD database
represents the working age population as a percentage of the total population. In 2012,
the working age population was 62.87%. In 2013, the working age population as a
percentage of the total population was 62.07%.
c. Labor force – all persons who fulfill the requirements for inclusion among
the employed (civilian employment plus the armed forces) or the unemployed. For 2013,
the total labor force for Japan was 110,826,700. The size of the female labor force for
Japan was 57,358,300 in 2013.
On the other hand, the definitions for other indicators required for the calculation for
the female labor force participation rate for the ILO are as follows:
a. Total population – persons of all ages who were living in the country during
the reference period, regardless of residency status or citizenship. There is no data
available for the total population in the ILO database.
b. Working age population – all persons above a specified minimum age
threshold for which an inquiry on economic activity is made, commonly defined as
persons aged 15 years and older. The total working age population for Japan was
110,975,800 in 2012 and 110,875,000 in 2013. The total female working age population
for Japan was 57,423,300 in 2012 and 57,382,500 in 2013.
c. Labor force – all persons of working age who furnish the supply of labor for
the production of goods and services during a specified time-reference period, sum total
of employed and unemployed. The size of the total labor force for Japan was
4

65,769,200 in 2013. The size of the total female labor force for Japan for the same year
was 28,040,000.
The differences in the data for the working age population and labor force are
striking. The ILO female labor force of Japan in 2013 is half of the OECD calculations
for the same year. Therefore, it is evident that there are differences in how the OECD
and ILO view the total population, the working age population, and the labor force,
which subsequently give rise to different labor force participation rates. Nonetheless,
the focus here should not be the discrepancies between the female labor force
participation rates, but rather the fact that the Japanese female labor force participation
rate significantly lags behind other advanced democracies.
Trends in Female Labor Force Participation Rates since the 1940s
How have female labor force participation rates changed over time? According
to the Population Census data from 1947 to 1995 and the Labor Force Survey data from
2000 to 2010 available on the ILO database, female labor force participation rates have
been stable across time. The noticeable dip in 2000 was largely a result of the transition
from Population Census data to Labor Force Survey data than actual changes in the
female labor force participation rates. The static nature of female labor force
participation rate in Japan despite the introduction of legislation such as Labor
Standards Act of 1947 and Child Care Law of 1991 indicates the need for greater
government intervention in both the public and private sectors to realize change and
harness the human capital currently out of reach.
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Figure 3: Japanese Female Labor Force Participation Rate since 1947 (Source:
International Labor Organization Database)
Female Employment Rate
In all 16 OECD countries, the female employment rate is lower than the male
employment rate. Even in terms of employment rate, Japan lags behind other countries.
Furthermore, there is more reason for concern given that the Japanese male
employment rate is the highest at 80%, thus demonstrating the greater gender inequality
in the Japanese workplace. Sweden and the United States both demonstrate a very
narrow gap between employment rates of men and women. The Swedish picture is more
desirable, however, given that the employment rates of both men and women are higher
at 76.3% and 72.5% respectively.
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Figure 4: Male and Female Employment Rates for 16 OECD Countries, 2013 (Source:
OECD Database)
Females in Part-time Employment
The concern for gender equality is not limited to the female labor force
participation rate. The type of employment – full-time or part-time – makes a difference
in the lives of women through earnings, health insurance, parental and sick leave, and
other fringe benefits. Thus, it is not only important that more women are engaged in
market work, but also involved in full-time employment. Currently, 35.2% of women
in the Japanese labor force are engaged in part-time work (Ministry of Internal Affairs
and Communications, 2012). Additionally, women make up 48.9% of part-time
employment, which is low compared to other OECD countries as can be seen in Figure
5. Nevertheless, there is no room for complacency as the percentage of women in parttime employment has increased (33.7% to 35.2%) as the percentage of women in fulltime employment decreased (44.7% to 42.5%) from 2007 to 2012 (Ministry of Internal
Affairs and Communications, 2012). This statistic indicates that women may lack the
opportunities to pursue full-time employment and are crowded out to part-time
employment. The lifetime employment system unique to Japan and Korea could explain
7

the crowding out effect of women, especially as they return from childbirth. I will
discuss the lifetime employment system in greater detail as I discuss policies for
flexible work arrangements.
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Figure 5: Females as a share of part-time employment, 2013 (Source: ILO Database)
Occupational segregation by gender
Thus far, I have studied the segregation of women into different types of jobs –
full time and part time. Now I turn my attention to occupational segregation by gender.
Across all societies, occupational segregation by gender is an inevitable, ugly reality.
Occupational segregation comes in two forms: horizontal segregation, where women
and men are employed in different occupations, and vertical segregation, where women
and men are employed in different positions within the same occupation (Anker, 2001).
Occupational segregation of gender is detrimental to women for various reasons: it
affects how men and women see women, which in turn affects women’s status and
income, and subsequently other important life variables such as mortality, morbidity,
and income inequality (Anker, 2001). Occupational segregation by gender is another
8

issue that must be addressed if any society seeks to achieve gender equality in the
workplace, especially if the segregation is not the result of the decision of the women
themselves.
Comparing the data available from the ILO Database, it can be seen that the
case of horizontal occupational segregation by gender in Japan is not very divergent
from that of Sweden. More women in both Japan and Sweden tend to work in
occupations of clerical support and service and sales, while less in occupations of
agriculture, forestry, and manufacturing. Nonetheless, there is a significance difference
that indicates Sweden’s superiority in gender equality – the gap between men and
women in managerial occupations is very small, and there are more women in
professional occupations than are men. This, along with evidence of vertical
occupational segregation to be explained below, demonstrates that there are not enough
women in management or full-time career tracks in Japan, which could contribute to
the creation of a negative feedback loop: women do not see role models to follow in
professional and managerial occupations, thus they feel discouraged from entering such
occupations, which leads to further segregation as women seek positions in which they
can easily identify a pipeline. Government intervention through policy could engender
change in occupational segregation by gender, which would contribute to the
achievement of greater gender equality in the Japanese workplace.
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Figure 6: Occupational Segregation by Gender in Japan (Source: International Labor
Organization Database)
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Figure 7: Occupational Segregation by Gender in Sweden (Source: International Labor
Organization Database)
Having studied horizontal occupational segregation, I now turn to vertical
segregation. Given the career and employment women find themselves in, are they
given opportunities to advance and acquire managerial positions? Additionally, do
10

women have adequate role models to look up to in the professional world? According
to the Global Gender Gap Index Report published by the World Economic Forum, there
are very few women in management in Japan. In the most recent version of the report
published in 2014, there was no data available for Japanese firms with female top
managers, nor was there any data available for firms with female participation in
ownership. The data that was available was dismal: the share of women on boards of
listed companies was 4%. The lack of women in management is corroborated by the
data presented by Steinberg: women managers make up less than 10% of all managers
(Steinberg, 2012). The silver lining for Japan was that the ability of women to rise to
positions of enterprise leadership was 4.5 on a 1-to-7 scale (Global Gender Gap Report
2014). This is positive in light of the fact that the ability of women to rise to positions
of enterprise leadership was 4 in 2013 (Global Gender Gap Report 2013).
In contrast to the situation in Japan, the picture for Sweden and the United States
are brighter. The share of women on boards of listed companies in Sweden is 17%,
more than four times that of Japan. The share of women in management in the US is
similarly high at 10% - almost three times the share of women in management in Japan.
Furthermore, the ability of women to rise to positions of enterprise leadership in
Sweden and the US are both higher at 5 (Global Gender Gap Report 2014).
Gender wage gap
The gender wage gap in Japan further corroborates the precarious position of
women wage earners. Looking at the total gender wage gap based on median male
earnings, Japan comes second only to Korea at 26.5%. Estévez-Abe looked at the
gender wage gap in the top and bottom quintiles to confirm that the gender wage gap
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in Japan comes second only to Korea, demonstrating a significant and persistent lag in
gender equality in the Japanese workplace (Estévez-Abe, 2013).
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Figure 8: Total gender wage gap of 12 OECD countries, represented as % of median
male earnings, 2012 (Source: OECD Database)
Education Profile of Female Labor Supply
Japan is not only underutilizing women in general, it is underutilizing a good
proportion of its most talented and educated women. Unlike other developed nations
that boast female employment of 70 to 90% of women who have completed tertiary
education, Japan only employs 67% of its most educated human capital.

12

Percent of Employed by Educational Attainment
100
90
80
% of employed 25 - 64 year
olds - primary education

70
60
50

% of employed 25 - 64 year
olds - lower secondary
education

40
30

% of employed 25 - 64 year
olds - upper secondary
education

20
10

% of employed 25 - 64 year
olds - tertiary education

0

Figure 9: Percent of Employed by Educational Attainment for 16 OECD Countries,
2014 (Source: OECD “Education at a Glance 2014”)
Age Profile of Female Labor Supply
In order to identify the particular subgroups for which policy can affect labor
force participation, it is important to analyze the data in terms of age as well. Edwards
examined the age profile of the female labor supply in Japan in 1984 and concluded
that it followed an M-shaped curve. That is, women’s labor force participation dropped
dramatically in prime childbearing years, creating a dip in the middle (Edwards, 1988).
The dip was prominent in 1984 with female labor force participation rate of 52% for
women aged 25 – 34 compared to 72.4% for women aged 20 – 24 and 68.1% for women
aged 40 – 44. While recent data demonstrates that the dip in female labor force
participation rate has decreased in size with time, the female labor supply of Japan still
maintains an M-shape. Furthermore, Matsui demonstrates that the M-shaped curve is a
unique feature to the Japanese and Korean labor supply (Matsui, 2010). The M-shape
13

curve is not evident in the female labor supply of both Sweden and the United States
(Figure 11). Thus, it will be important to create policy that accommodates the needs
and desires of Japanese women who are trying to fulfill the dual roles of wage earners
and wives or mothers to realize greater female labor force participation. Policy
comparison between Sweden and Japan will be particularly useful in identifying ways
Japan can enact policy that is favorable to women in their prime childbearing years.
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Figure 10: Age Profile of Japanese Female Labor Supply 2007, 2012 (Source:
Employment Status Survey 2012, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications)
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Figure 11: Age Profile of Female Labor Supply of Japan, Sweden, and the United States
in 2012 (Sources: Employment Status Survey 2012 by Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Communication, US Bureau of Labor Statistics, OECD Database)
Target Area for Increased Female Labor Force Participation in Japan
Given the data, it is clear that Japan is behind other developed countries in
achieving greater gender equality in the workplace. It especially fails to engage women
who have completed higher education and women in their prime childbearing years.
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2.2 Previous Studies on Female Labor Force Participation
Before discussing previous studies that have explored the factors affecting
female labor force participation, it is important to establish the significance and
desirability of gender equality. Gender equality is valued for two main reasons – as a
means to an end and as an end in and of itself. First, it is widely recognized that greater
gender equality can enhance economic productivity and improve development
outcomes. There are three processes by which gender equality begets greater economic
growth. First, by giving women the same access to resources as men and better
allocating skill and talent, women’s skills can be harnessed to boost overall productivity.
Second, by enabling women to take better control of household finances through
women’s earnings or cash transfers, changes in spending that benefit children can be
realized, enhancing a country’s growth prospects. Finally, by empowering women as
“economic, political, and social actors”, institutions and policy will change in manners
that are more representative of women and children (Revenga & Shetty, 2012; 41).
Furthermore, gender equality is valued in its own right. Sen argues “development is a
process of expanding freedoms equally for all people – male and female” (as cited in
Revenga & Shetty, 2012; 41).
Japan has a particular interest in gender equality in the workplace – greater
female labor force participation – as a means to ensure economic growth. Japan faces
an acute demographic crisis caused by low fertility rates and an ageing population.
Matsui predicts that the overall Japanese population will shrink by 10% by 2030, and
as much as 30% by 2055. By 2055, the proportion of the elderly will double from 20%
to 40%, and the working age population will decline by half, assuming no change in
current fertility or immigration trends (Matsui et al, 2010). Prime Minister Abe also
recognizes the challenges of a declining population, having raised the issue in his
16

speech at the World Economic Forum in 2014: “Japan is becoming a super-ageing
society, even as the number of children is falling… female labor force in Japan is the
most under-utilized resource” (Abe, 2014). Therefore it is in Japan’s economic interest
to increase female labor force participation; hence greater gender equality in the
workplace is desirable, if not necessary.
Having discussed the significance and desirability of gender equality in the
workplace, I now turn to an overview of previous studies on female labor force
participation. Current literature on female labor force participation, especially that of
married women, is grounded on the theoretical framework uncovered by Mincer. Prior
to Mincer, it was standard to assume that 1) leisure was a normal good, 2) there was a
two-way decision between leisure and work, 3) amount of work provided by an
individual was determined by the aggregate effects of the income and substitution
effects. Thus, labor supply was backward bending for both men and women. However,
Mincer accurately demonstrated that labor supply and the decision to engage in market
work was different for women. Rather than a dichotomous work-leisure decision,
women had to choose from among leisure, market work (paid), and housework or
family chores (unpaid). Furthermore, the relevant income variable for the decision
regarding labor was not the individual’s market earnings, but rather total family income
(Mincer, 1962). Mincer thus opened the doors to considering a wider range of factors
that contribute to the woman’s decision to engage in market labor, particularly those
that affect unpaid work in the household.
Long, a contemporary of Mincer, recognizes Mincer’s novel contributions to
the analysis of the relationship between real income and labor force participation. His
studies reveal the importance of unpaid work in the market labor decision of a woman.
Factors that affect household work such as the declining burden of housework,
17

declining hours of work in office and factory jobs that allow women to perform the dual
roles of wage earner and wife or mother, and the opening of new opportunities, as well
as rising wages and improved education have a significant bearing on female labor
force participation (Long, 1962).
Current literature on female labor force participation has expanded Mincer’s
foundational work. The acceptance of the three-way choice between leisure, paid work,
and unpaid housework or family chores has led to an increased focus on affecting the
relationship between market work and housework. The understanding of two income
variables for the woman’s decision to work – individual’s earnings and total family
income – have led to an increased focus on the need to consider multiple types of
income. Various scholars have addressed the factors that may affect incentives for
unpaid housework, including family structure (Sasaki, 2002), childcare policies such as
parental leave and subsidies (Abe, 2013; Waldfogel, 2001; Xuan, 2013; Waldfogel,
1999), and taxation (Xuan, 2013; Matsui, 2010).
Most notably, a study published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) in 2004 adequately summarizes popular literature regarding
policies to increase female labor force participation. In order to achieve greater female
labor force participation, policy should provide flexibility of working time
arrangements to help women combine market work with household activities, family
taxation to affect the earnings of women outside of the home and thereby influence the
decision between paid work and unpaid work, and support to maintenance and care of
children (OECD, 2004). Given that Japan fails to adequately harness its most talented
women and women in their prime childbearing years, it is most pertinent to identify
policy that increases the incentives for market work and allows the reconciliation of the
various roles of a woman. Therefore, this paper will analyze the policies affecting
18

female labor force participation in Japan, Sweden, and the United States according to
the three broad categories of policy outlined in the OECD study.
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3. Policy Options
3.1 Family Support
It is evident that greater family support has a positive effect on female labor
force participation rate. Given that the responsibility of childrearing is universal across
the world, it would be insightful to compare different types of family support offered
by different nations in order to understand how policy should be formulated so that it
may have the greatest impact. Waldfogel identifies three policy options available to
governments to support families, particularly in the realm of childcare. First,
governments can enact parental leave policies providing parents employed before
childbirth some time off from work to care for the child themselves. Parental leave
policies include maternity, paternity, and parental leave. Second, governments can
enact childcare policies, providing non-parental childcare through subsidies or direct
provision. Finally, governments can provide early childhood benefits, which are cash
grants that can be used to cover the costs of raising a child. These benefits may take the
form of replacing foregone earnings, providing childcare payments, or a combination
of the two (Waldfogel, 2001). In this section, I will take a closer look at the parental
leave policies, childcare policies, and early childhood benefits of Japan, Sweden, and
the United States to identify opportunities for change in Japanese policy that may
increase female labor force participation.
3.1.1 Parental Leave Policies
The prevailing international definition of parental leave comes from the
International

Labor

Organization’s

Workers

with

Family

Responsibilities

Recommendation 1981, which articulates that “either parent should have the possibility,
within a period immediately following maternity leave, of obtaining leave of absence,
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without relinquishing employment” (ILO, 1981). From this recommendation, Bollé
draws the conclusion that parental leave is distinct from both maternity and paternity
leave in that it may be taken by either the mother or the father and that it does not entail
loss of employment or of any associated rights (Bollé, 2001). While there is variation
among countries regarding the existence of legislation for maternity, paternity, and
parental leave, it is often the case that legislation uses the language of maternity leave
while in practice allowing the right to leave for both the mother and father. This is
distinguished by the basis of the right for leave: it can be family-based – if one parent
does not take it, it is lost for the family – or individual-based – each parent is entitled
to their respective leave (Pronzato, 2009). In this section, maternity leave and parental
leave will be used interchangeably unless the right to leave is individual-based and
meant specifically for the mother or father.
First, I will study parental leave policy in Japan. Japan recognized the need to
provide mothers some time off from work to care for their children early in its era of
economic development post-World War II. Childcare leave for mothers was initially
introduced in the Labor Standards Act of 1947. Article 67 decrees that “A woman
raising an infant under the age of one full year may request time to raise the infant of
at least thirty minutes, twice a day, in addition to the rest periods [indicated in other
articles of the legislation]” (Ministry of Labor, 1995). While it should be applauded that
the government recognized the need to address women’s roles as mothers, the law fell
very short of providing adequate support. Waldfogel, Higuchi, and Abe find that many
women were not able to enjoy even this basic form of childcare leave because they were
in ineligible due to their contingent or part-time employment status (Waldfogel,
Higuchi & Abe, 1999). Additionally, the Labor Standards Act of 1947 prohibited the
hiring of women who were pregnant or had just given birth. Therefore, while maternity
21

leave was incorporated, it failed to have any significant impact in the lives of women
as wage earners.
Parental leave policy that can be found in Japan today was introduced through
the Act on the Welfare of Workers Who Take Care of Children or Other Family
Members Including Child Care and Family Care Leave of 1991 (hereby referred to as
Child Care Law of 1991). The Law allowed an employee to take paid parental leave
when the child is under the age of one, with leave terminating once the child reached
the age of one. Parental leave could be extended for an additional six months if a spouse
had used their leave until the child reached the age of one and the second spouse was
requesting child care leave after the termination of the first spouse’s leave. The law also
mandated the replacement of income: mothers are paid at 60% beginning 6 weeks
before the birth if they chose to take leave from that point on. After childbirth, a parent
is paid at 30% until the child turns 1. If the parent returns to work after leave, they
receive a lump sum that brings their replacement rate to 40% (Gornitt and Schmitt,
2010). Other forms of childcare leave were also provided through the Law of 1991,
such as care of sick children: workers could request up to five working days of sick or
injured childcare leave per fiscal year. Additionally, workers with pre-school children
found that overtime work beyond certain limitations and late night work (from 10 PM
to 5 AM) were prohibited, pursuant to Articles 17 and 19. The Law of 1991 applied to
firms with more than thirty employees when it was first promulgated. The application
of the law was extended to firms with less than thirty employees in 1995.
Child Care Law of 1991 has subsequently been amended three times. First, it
was amended in July 16, 2003 to make it the duty of the local authorities to provide
plans to facilitate childcare. It was amended again in July 24, 2003 to help mothers of

22

fatherless families. Finally, the law was amended one again in December 2004 to
extend parental leave to fixed-contract employees.
Parental leave in the United States was formally introduced as legislation in
1993 with the passage of the Family and Medical Leave Act. Prior to the Family and
Medical Leave Act, family support was provided through the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act of 1978, which mandated that any employer providing temporarily disabled
employees paid or unpaid leave must offer the same to women who are temporarily
disabled due to pregnancy. Beyond the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, state leave
legislation, union contracts, and voluntary initiatives provided parental leave to
American women in the labor force. 11 states and the District of Columbia had laws
providing protected maternity leaves in effect before the passage of the Family and
Medical Leave Act (Waldfogel, 1999). The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,
widely recognized as the first federal law to provide maternity leave rights, requires
employers with more than fifty employees to offer job-protected family or medical
leave of up to twelve weeks to qualifying employees. Employees qualify for leave if
they have worked at least 1250 hours in the prior year. While the law does not require
paid leave, it does require employers who provide health insurance coverage to
continue to do so during the leave period. Recently, there have been efforts at the state
level to provide paid leave. For example, California’s Paid Family Leave Insurance
Program mandates paid leave of up to 6 weeks (Baker and Milligan, 2008).
Sweden has one of the longest histories of gender equality legislation in the
world. Sweden developed as a strong modern welfare state since the early 20th century.
As such, its aim was general redistribution of income and welfare, implying a stronger
commitment to full employment (Anker, 2001). Alongside the development of Sweden
as a welfare state were changes in the conception of gender norms and roles. In the
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1930s, the writing of Alva and Gunnar Myrdal sparked the recognition of women as
society’s greatest asset. They insisted “that women had the right to develop their talents
to the fullest in other fields and particularly in paid employment” (Lewis and Astrom,
1992; 66). In the late 1940s, the ideas of Viola Klein called for greater state support for
motherhood and flexibility from employers so that women could reconcile their two
roles. Maternity leave thus emerged early in the 1950s: mothers were entitled to six
months of maternity leave and flat rate benefits during leave, with additional subsidy
for 90 days (Lewis and Astrom, 1992).
Sweden officially promulgated parental leave in 1974 with the introduction of
parental insurance. Swedish policy at the time allowed for parental leave of six months
before the child reached 4 years of age, with an additional provision of 10 sick days per
child. Legislation also mandated compensation for loss of market earnings to both
women and men.
Throughout the decades, parental leave has been amended. Today, parental
leave is granted on a family basis. The total maximum duration of parental leave is 18
months, with one month of “use-or-lose” maternity and paternity leave. Leave may be
taken at any time until the child’s 8th birthday. In order to be eligible for leave,
employees must have worked for the employer for at least 6 months. Similar to Japan,
Swedish law provides for paid leave – parents are given an allowance that replaces 80%
of their earnings for 13 months, and 180 Swedish Kronas per day thereafter (Garnitt
and Schmitt, 2010).
Given current legislation, the following comparisons can be made. First,
Japanese parental leave policy is just as expansive and generous as Swedish parental
leave policy in terms of leave duration and firms covered by legislation. Both Japan
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and Sweden offer 18 months of parental leave, and legislation covers virtually
businesses of all sizes. On the other hand, the US only allows for 12 weeks of parental
leave and the Family and Medical Leave Act only covers firms with more than 50
employees. It is puzzling then that Japanese female labor force participation rates are
not on par with those of Sweden despite generous policy. It is particularly startling that
mothers are choosing to drop out of the labor force, despite the long job protection
offered by legislation. Could it be that 18 months of leave is too long to maintain labor
force attachment and contribute to job continuity?
The literature on length of leave and its impacts on women’s employment are
mixed. Scholars cannot agree whether generous leave is beneficial for women wage
earners given its differential impact on job continuity, upward mobility post-birth, and
wages. In terms of job continuity, Klerman and Leibowitz argue “leave reduces the
number of women quitting jobs pre-birth to spend time and home and clearly increases
the number of women who are employed and on leave over the birth event” (cited in
Baker and Milligan, 2008; 658). Similarly Pronzato finds that while longer periods of
job-protection increase the hazard of returning to work, “if policy goal is to increase
female labor market participation, we find that longer periods of job-protection make
women more likely to return to work after a child’s birth” (Pronzato, 2009; 358). Hence,
it can be argued that generous leave duration has a positive effect on job continuity,
thus women’s employment.
In terms of upward mobility and opportunities for promotions after returning
from leave, the picture is not so positive. Evertsson and Duvander find that women with
leaves of 16 months or more were less likely to experience an upward occupational
move once back on the job again (Evertsson and Duvander, 2010). Granqvist and
Persson found that “on average, women had about half the chance that men had of
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making an upward occupational move” (cited in Evertsson and Duvander, 2010; 4).
Korpi and Stern demonstrate that women with children have the least job mobility, and
Kennerberg claims that women who had children in the period were less likely to have
changed to a highly qualified job (cited in Evertsson and Duvander, 2010). Hence while
generous leave may provide for greater employment of women as mothers choose to
temporarily leave their jobs rather than quitting, it keeps them segregated in positions
of lower prestige and authority.
Finally, in terms of wages, literature is very ambiguous. Ruhm shows that leave
entitlements could have different impacts on the wages of women. He models the
effects of leave legislation for women’s wage and employment using supply and
demand. First, he argues that when women take leave, labor costs borne by the
employers cause a downward shift in the demand curve (D2, Figure 12). At the same
time, because employers receive the benefits of labor retention, the supply curve shifts
down (S2). In this new equilibrium (E2), employment of women may increase (depends
on the size of the shifts of the demand and supply curves)1 though the equilibrium wage
will have unequivocally decreased. Nonetheless, there could be an alternate situation
where wages rise simultaneously with employment if family leave raises firm-specific
human capital, thereby increasing the marginal product of labor (D3). Other scholars
assert that generous leave does not singlehandedly reduce women’s wages. Albrecht
and others point to the signaling effect as a major cause of relatively lower wages:
women who take out longer leave are signaling their lesser commitment to the job
(Albrecht et al, 1999). As such, the negative effects of leave on wages is not so much a

While the Ruhm’s model is applicable for both men and women who take leave, what is striking
about the case for women is the magnitude of the shift in the curves that ultimately leads to a greater
decrease in wages than it would be the case if men took leave.
1
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product of the generosity of legislation, but the underlying characteristics of people
who choose longer leave: it is a selection issue.

Figure 12: Consequences of Leave Mandates (Source: Ruhm, 1997)
All three aspects of employment – continuity, mobility, and wages – are
important for female labor market participation. It is important to provide women equal
opportunity to realize their careers. Nonetheless, given the focus of this paper which
addresses the lagging female labor force participation rates of Japanese women, it
would seem most appropriate to conclude that generous leave duration is good for
higher participation, especially for mothers. In order to make sure policy does realize
the results we desire, more effort needs to be expended in the encouragement of the
take up of parental leave.

27

Another key insight from the comparison of policy is that Sweden and Japan
both provide replacement of lost income by mandating paid leave. A study of parental
leave in the US and Sweden revealed that some people gave up leave in the US because
of the loss of income it entailed – when faced with the decision to quit or take leave,
women may choose to drop out of the labor force given that leave provides no financial
incentives to quitting. Bollé finds that “parental leave arrangements may have a positive
effect on… gender equality, provided that certain conditions are met, notably if an
allowance adequately compensates for lost income” (Bollé, 2001; 634). In this sense,
Japanese policy is favorable for female labor force participation. However, the
economic dilemma of leave is not completely mitigated, given the low income
replacement rates of 30% for maternity leave and 40% for shared parental leave.
Therefore, it would be advisable for Japan to consider provisions for greater
replacement of lost income to incentivize the take up of leave.
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3.1.2 Child Care Policies
Childcare is widely accepted as an important contributor to a woman’s labor
market participation. Literature highlights two critical aspects of childcare that must be
addressed by policy: affordability and availability. To begin with, Heckman’s widely
accepted theory states that childcare costs are a reduction in a woman’s net wages,
which results in a flattening of the budget constraint. This cost affects a woman’s
decision-making, and thereby results in a reduction in female labor supply (Heckman,
1974). Oishi supports Heckman’s theory by demonstrating that childcare fees have
significantly negative effects on maternal labor force participation (Oishi, 2002). Thus
making childcare affordable so that women reap the returns to labor market
participation is critical to the increase in female labor force participation, especially for
the 30 – 44 year old age group where a noticeable decline in labor force participation
can be observed to this day.
Availability of childcare is another critical dimension for policy. By studying
the relationship and causality between childcare availability, female labor force
participation rate, and fertility, Lee and Lee argue the importance of the “Japanese
childcare system in supporting female employment” (Lee and Lee, 2014; 72). Previous
to Lee and Lee, Stolzenberg and Waite found a large positive effect of childcare
availability on female labor force participation (Stolzenberg and Waite, 1984).
Kreyenfeld and Hank studied the availability of childcare in Germany and its effect on
female labor force participation. By using hours spent in childcare as availability, Bub
and McCartney identified a positive effect of hours spent in childcare on hours of
maternal employment (Bub and McCartney, 2004). Therefore, there is abundant
evidence to support that availability of childcare is significant for the employment of
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women. In this section, I will study and compare childcare policies of Japan, US, and
Sweden focusing on the two dimensions of affordability and availability.
I begin my analysis with Sweden, the exemplar of gender equality policy. As
mentioned above in the analysis of parental leave, Sweden has a long history of gender
quality in the workplace. While parental leave policy (maternity leave, paternity leave,
and shared leave) was motivated by the belief that women need to be able to reconcile
their two roles, childcare policy was motivated by the belief that “demands for gender
equality does not only concern changes in women’s circumstances, but also men’s”
(Nyberg, 2004; 1-2). Furthermore, given Sweden’s commitment to a welfare state,
public childcare was seen as a social infrastructure provided by the government: preschool childcare is a public responsibility, hence childcare spots are guaranteed for all
children starting at age 1 if both parents work, and most of the costs of childcare are
subsidized (Waldfogel, 2001). Until the 1980s, Swedish national government aimed to
guarantee a uniform public childcare system that offered the same conditions
throughout the country and public childcare (alongside informal arrangements with
family members and neighbors), and under this regime, public childcare was the only
form of childcare available in Sweden.
Nonetheless, given the continuous shortage of supply relative to demand, as
well as the economic recession that debilitated Sweden in the 1990s, the national
government turned to decentralize childcare. Decision-making was transferred from the
national government to the municipalities, and financial support for childcare policy
was altered accordingly from program-specific grants to block grants. Though the
national government turned the reigns to the municipalities, it maintained availability
by expanding eligibility of public childcare to pre-school aged children with parents
who were employed, studying, unemployed, or took care of other children with special
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needs. It maintained affordability by introducing a maximum childcare fee payable by
parents in 2002 (Nyberg, 2004).
Municipalities have maintained the integrity of public childcare by meeting the
demands of working parents as much as possible. According to Nyberg, a large
proportion of childcare centers are open for 10 – 12 hours a day and approximately half
of the municipalities offer night-care for parents that work at night (Nyberg, 2002). 15
hours of pre-school per week are free for children aged 3 – 6. The quality of childcare
is commendable as well, since almost all teachers are university-trained. Encouraged
by the availability, affordability, and quality of childcare, 95% of children aged 3 – 6
are enrolled in public childcare (EU, 2014) though a small private sector exists in the
form of parent cooperatives, employee cooperatives, and company-run childcare
centers (Nyberg, 2004).
The US is diametrically opposite to Sweden in terms of childcare policy. The
heavy emphasis on rights and freedom leads to the belief in minimal state intervention,
which translates to the view that pre-school childcare is a private decision of the parents
unless early intervention programs are necessary (Waldfogel, 2001). As a result, most
of the costs of childcare are borne by parents and subsidies and credits are mostly
limited to employment programs meant to incentivize the labor market participation of
low-income families (Meyers, Heintze, and Wolf, 2002; Blank, 1994). Only notable
policies for childcare are the Child Care and Development Block Grant passed in 1990
(which authorized new grants to states to fund childcare assistance to low income
households) and the Head Start program (which improves the school readiness of young
children from low income families). In contrast to Sweden, there is virtually no direct
provision of childcare by the government.
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Japan is an interesting case situated in between the two extremes of Sweden and
the US. A cursory study of the history of childcare policy in Japan demonstrates that
while it began as a welfare state similar to Sweden, it now promotes free market
approaches to childcare, much like the US. The government – with the municipalities
as the key policy and decision-making agents – is responsible for the local daycare
system. Daycare centers were first made available in 1892 to accommodate factory
workers. Later in 1946, municipalities officially became accountable for providing
child daycare (Palley and Usui, 2008). The government accredits both the public and
private daycare centers and provides subsidies. The childcare system in Japan largely
consists of two types of centers: yochien and hoikuen. Yochien provide educational and
social stimulation for pre-school children, catering mainly to the children of the wealthy.
They are established with the expectation that there is a stay-at-home mom that will
take care of the child. Hence, yochien are open only for 4 hours in the day, from 10 AM
to 2 PM and open for 39 weeks of the year. Yochien are under the responsibility of the
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology. On the other hand,
hoikuen are meant to cater to the children of the working class to protect them from
risk. As such, they have longer hours of operation (8 – 11 hours a day), are open
throughout the year, and accept children ages 1 – 5. Hoikuen are under the responsibility
of the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare (Palley and Usui, 2008).
Since 1946, the government maintained tight control over childcare. Private
childcare was almost non-existent. However, long waiting lists for admission into
childcare centers, hours that were either too short or inflexible to meet the needs of
working parents, lack of accommodation for children who fell ill, and lack of available
space for workers who were not deemed needy enough meant that supply for childcare
fell very short of demand (Palley and Usui, 2008). Availability was a critical issue,
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given the stringent criteria of eligibility for childcare. “Admittance to day care is not
automatic… parents must prove that the mother is unable to take care of the child and
that no one else in the household… is available for childcare” (Fujita, 1989; 81). For
mothers employed by a firm, this meant obtaining a document of proof from their
employer. For mothers doing piecework at home, this meant obtaining a document from
the person they work for. For self-employed mothers, there was no valid way to prove
their employment.
The Japanese government sought to improve childcare to promote female labor
force participation and fertility rates through a series of legislative reforms that
addressed the problems with the childcare system. The Angel Plan (1994 – 1998)
sought to increase the number of daycare centers and improve their services by
expanding the number of spaces in licensed centers for babies aged 0 – 3, extending the
hours of service, and allowing for temporary or drop-in care. Despite the best efforts of
the Japanese government, there was still a serious mismatch between supply and
demand, which resulted in the enactment of the Law on the Welfare of Children in 1997.
From here onwards, the Japanese government adopted a more market-based approach
to childcare, deregulating the private sector. In 1999, the New Angel Plan came into
action. Under this plan, the Japanese government intended to further encourage private
actors by providing subsidies to employers that built in-house daycare centers, among
other provisions (Palley and Usui, 2008). Through the concerted effort of the
government, a large proportion of the issue of availability has been addressed – both
public and private childcare options have been expanded. Nonetheless, there are still
more children on waitlists than in childcare centers (Matsui, 2010).
How affordable is Japanese childcare? Recall that childcare in Sweden is
extremely affordable due to the ceiling on fees payable by parents. The cost of childcare
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in Japan depends on the form of childcare, hours of operation, and types of services.
For example, the average costs of different forms of childcare in Japan are as follows:
a. Public daycare: 10,000 yen (85 dollars) per month including meals
b. Private daycare: 40,000 – 80,000 yen (330 – 670 dollars) per month including
meals (Japan Health Info, 2015).
While these costs are more affordable than childcare costs in the US where the
cost of pre-school childcare fall in the range of 500 dollars per month to 1400 dollars
per month (Child Care Aware of America and New York, 2014), they are higher
compared to the fee ceiling of Sweden (146 euros, 150 dollars; EU, 2014). Given the
fee ceiling in Sweden, no parent should pay more than 3% of his or her income as
childcare costs. On the hand, considering that the average monthly income of
households of two persons or more in Japan is 488,519 yen (Ministry of Internal Affairs
and Communication, 2015), it appears to be the case that Japanese parents are paying
anywhere from 2% to 16% of their income. Japanese childcare is expensive, and can
be a significant portion of a household’s expenditures.
In light of such policy descriptions, the following comparisons can be made.
First, Japan’s policy cannot be fairly compared to that of the US, given the stark
differences in the degree of government intervention in childcare. Second, while Japan
has made consistent efforts to address the issue of availability of spaces of childcare, it
does not provide a universal guarantee to all children of pre-school age as Sweden does.
In order to provide further support to households, but particularly mothers as they
attempt to engage in market activity, Japan must make it a policy priority to guarantee
all children a space in childcare. This does not only mean more physical spaces, but
also means removing eligibility criteria that require mothers’ proof of employment.
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Third, Japanese childcare is less affordable than that of Sweden, and in some cases,
households are paying 16% of their income to have their children taken care of while
the parents are at work. While the families paying 16% are most likely to be of higher
income, it is important to identify empirically if that is the case. It could be that middleincome families incur such high costs because no alternatives are available in their
vicinity. Japan needs to identify who incurs the costs of childcare, and the extent to
which it reduces household income and thereby the returns to a woman’s employment,
and rectify the situation by providing more subsidies or transforming a portion of its
public childcare into means-tested programs.
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3.1.3 Early Childhood Benefits
Early childhood benefits are cash grants to families with children under the age
of three. Unlike welfare transfer payments, early childhood benefits are provided to all
families, regardless of whether or not parents work in the labor market (Waldfogel,
2001). Unlike parental leave policy and childcare policy, early childhood benefits are
not as prevalent in policy affecting the female labor force participation rate. Nowadays,
childhood benefits come in the form of allowances whereby governments provide
financial assistance for parents raising children, mainly motivated by the need to raise
fertility rates.
As an effort to battle low fertility rates, Japan has instituted several child
allowances. Today, there is a child allowance called jido teate available for all parents
of children. Jido teate is paid for all children aged 0 – 15. For children under 3 years
old, parents receive 15,000 yen (125 dollars) per month per child. For children in
elementary school, parents receive 10,000 yen (85 dollars) per month per child (first
and second child; 15,000 yen per month for the third child). For children in middle
school and under the age of 15, parents receive 10,000 yen per month for all children.
If the family exceeds the income requirement, they receive 5,000 yen per month for all
children. Japan has a generous policy for child allowances, considering its expansive
duration and coverage.
On the other hand, in the US there is a striking absence of non-means tested
cash grants and transfer payments. There are no identifiable early childhood benefits or
child allowances aside from childcare subsidies and tax credits.
In Sweden, early childhood benefits – separate from childcare subsidies and tax
credits – were introduced with parental insurance in 1974. However, it was repealed
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due to concerns regarding the impacts of benefits on the commitment to publicly funded
childcare (Waldfogel, 2001). Today, Sweden offers child allowances up to 1,050
Swedish Kronas per month (120 dollars) per child, with greater allowances for families
with 5 or more children (EU, 2014).
With regards to child allowances, Japan is more progressive than both the US
and Sweden. While these allowances are in place to raise fertility rates, they serve to
alleviate some of the financial burden parents face by raising children. These
allowances may be able to offset the reduction of wages due to childcare costs, which
decreases the extent to which a mother’s budget constraint flattens out. Child
allowances allow women to enjoy more of the returns to their market labor, and thus
encourage greater female labor force participation. Nonetheless, non-conditional cash
grants may lead to less female labor force participation if the income effects are stronger
than the substitution effects in a work-leisure decision. Therefore, in order to ensure
than more money in the hands of the parents results in higher labor force participation,
it may be helpful for Japan to explore employment-linked incentive programs.
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3.2 Taxation
Taxation is a key component to successful policy affecting female labor force
participation rates. There are two forms of taxation systems used commonly across the
world. First, there is joint taxation, where federal or national income taxes paid by two
spouses equals the tax paid by two singles, where each single earns half of the family
earnings. For this reason, joint taxation is also known as “split taxation.” Those who
believe in horizontal equity advocate joint taxation. That is, two married couples with
the same total income should face the same tax liability (LaLumia, 2008). Second, there
is separate or individual taxation, where the unit of taxation is individual, regardless of
marital status. Those who believe in marriage neutrality promote individual taxation
(LaLumia, 2008). They assert that it is removes the marriage penalty or benefit imposed
by joint taxation.
Previous literature is unambiguous regarding the effect of tax systems on labor
force participation. Individual taxation is preferred to joint taxation if we desire a
positive effect on the labor force participation of women, especially married women.
Under joint taxation, the average tax rate faced by the wife is a function of the ‘last
dollar’ marginal tax rate of her husband. As a result, most of the income earned by the
wife faces a higher tax rate than that of the primary earner, the husband. The greater tax
liability faced by the secondary earner, generally the wife, means lesser returns to work,
which disincentivizes labor market participation. Under individual taxation, the link
between the husband’s income and the wife’s average tax rate is abolished and the wife
is able to realize more of her earnings (Selin, 2009). Studies of the US tax system as it
changed from separate taxation to joint taxation demonstrate that there was a 2%
decline in employment of married women associated with the change in the unit of
taxation (LaLumia, 2008). Hausman modeled the effects of wages, taxes, and fixed
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costs on women’s labor force participation and concluded that high marginal tax rates
(under joint taxation) serve “as a disincentive to labor force participation” (Hausman,
1980; 163). By comparing the labor supply of married women in Sweden and Germany,
Gustafsson came to the conclusion that “joint or split taxation tends to conserve sex
roles and make women more dependent on their husbands by decreasing married
women’s economic remunerations from participating in the labor force” (Gustafsson,
1992; 82). And further evidence abounds. It is clear that a system of separate taxation
that provides for marriage neutrality is preferable to joint taxation, though some couples
may benefit from greater after-tax income under joint taxation.
As was the case with childcare policy, Sweden and the US are diametrical
opposites in terms of the tax system. The US started as a system of individual taxation
until 1948, when the Revenue Act of 1948 introduced the system of joint taxation.
Before the introduction of joint taxation, there were great inequalities between families
that had similar earnings and great differentials between the spouses due to the highly
progressive tax code. Because men faced higher marginal tax rates, the couple in which
one spouse had much greater income than the other ended up paying more taxes than a
couple where income was more evenly divided among the spouses. Driven by the desire
for horizontal equity, the US introduced joint taxation. Joint taxation in the US had the
effect of decreasing the labor force participation of women for two reasons: 1) the
marginal tax rates of a husband and wife were equalized– this meant that marginal tax
rates were raised for women, which disincentivized market labor, and 2) the substitution
effect of joint taxation led to a reduction in tax liability (for most households), which
led to an increase in household income. Assuming leisure is a normal good, more
income leads to more consumption of leisure, and that is precisely what happened with
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the introduction of joint taxation (LaLumia, 2008). Tax policy could explain the
plateauing female labor force participation rates in the US.
On the other hand, Sweden started with a system of joint taxation. However, in
the 1940s, there was a strong public movement against high marginal taxes on married
women’s earnings. In the 1950s, numerous economic forecasts projected a shortage of
labor and pointed to married women as important resources to address the issue. In
1966, optional separate taxation was introduced for the first time, and in 1971, separate
taxation became compulsory. Swedish taxation is lauded as the ‘ideal type of taxation’,
“tailored to individualized patterns of labor force participation”, leading to the highest
share of dual-earner households among several European countries (Dingeldey, 2001;
660). Additionally, there is evidence to support the importance of separate taxation:
employment among married women would have been 10% lower in 1975 if Sweden
had still used a joint taxation system (Selin, 2009). While taxation does not fully explain
the high female labor force participation rate in Sweden (Dingeldey, 2001), it does play
a significant role and highlights the need of a separate taxation system if higher female
labor force participation is desired.
Once again, Japan presents itself as an interesting case with regards to policy
affecting female labor force participation. Japan has always had a system of separate
taxation. There is no option to file for joint taxation. Nonetheless, the tax system
disfavors women, especially mothers from engaging in labor market work for two main
reasons. First, there are laws that make spouses dependents of the primary earner.
Allowances for Spouses Legislation passed in 1961 and Special Allowances for
Spouses Legislation passed in 1987 provide for special deductions from the primary
earner’s wage if the spouse (usually the wife) earns an income before a certain threshold
level. These laws have not only legally marked spouses as dependents of the primary
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earner, but have also prompted married women to work for limited days or forego work
completely to reduce their husband’s income tax and thus lower the household’s tax
liabilities (Akabayashi, 2006). Second, the national pension system discourages women
from actively engaging in the labor market as well. The National Pension Plan classifies
people into three categories. Category I includes self-employed and unemployed
individuals. Category II includes employees of the private and public sectors. Category
III includes dependent spouses of the persons included in Category II. In order to be
eligible for Category III, the annual personal gross income of a dependent (usually a
wife) whose spouse is covered under Category II must be below a certain threshold. If
this condition is met, the dependent is included in the National Pension Plan without
any additional premium payment. If the annual personal gross income exceeds the
threshold, the spouse is considered independently. This structure of social security
adversely affects the participation of married women. Similar to the Allowances for
Spouses Legislation, the categories of the National Pension Plan, as well as the
conditions for eligibility for Category III, disincentivize the labor force participation of
women (Akabayashi, 2006).
Drawing conclusions from the US and Sweden, separate taxation is preferred
over joint taxation for the purposes of increasing female labor force participation. Japan
has adopted the correct framework. Nonetheless, it has not created a favorable
environment because of its two unique laws that corroborate existing gender norms. If
Japan desires to increase female labor force participation, it must recognize women as
individual and independent wage earners, both in name and practice.
There are other aspects of taxation that can contribute to greater female labor
force participation, such as child subsidies, child tax credits, and deductions. For
example, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) implemented in the US has been
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successful in increasing the participation of women who were previously not involved
in the labor force (Eissa and Hoynes, 2006). Though the EITC is a means-tested
program, its main components could be used to devise an optimal tax program that
incentivizes the participation of women. While child subsidies, tax credits, and
deductions contribute to greater gender equality, given the complexities and
peculiarities of tax legislation, further analysis of other tax instruments will be deferred
to a future opportunity.
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3.3 Flexibility of Working Time Arrangements
Women face a unique decision among paid labor market work, unpaid
household work, and leisure. In order to facilitate female labor force participation,
policy needs to support work-life balance. Flexible working time arrangements, which
allow women to vary their work schedules from the typical day of fixed working hours,
permit women to achieve a greater balance between work and other responsibilities.
Previous studies have demonstrated that flexible working arrangements are important
in supporting both men and women combine work and family (Allard, Haas, and
Hwang, 2007; Anderson et al, 2002; Atkinson, 2009).
In terms of flexible work time arrangements, the US and Sweden are similar to
each other: there is no formal legislation that mandates how flexible work time
arrangements should be implemented and decision making is highly decentralized.
However, the way in which flexible working times are arranged are slightly different
between the two countries. In the US, the process is more individualistic: the decision
to deviate from a 9 to 5, 40-hour workweek is completely between the individual
employee and his or her employer (US Department of Labor). On the other hand, the
process is more collective in Sweden: social partners make innovative working time
arrangements at the industry or firm level (Anxo, 1995). As such, both flextime
(variation of working hours) and flexleave (different leave and absences) arrangements
are widely used in the US and Sweden.
In Japan, there is currently no institutional support for any form of flexible work
time arrangement due to the lifetime employment system. The lifetime employment
system refers to an internal labor market structure of the large firms in the economy
where workers are hired directly upon graduation from school and move up ladders
43

through principles of seniority and merit (Brinton, 1989). Promotions and wage
increases are directly tied to the years worked at one particular firm. Japanese firms pay
generous benefits to the regular workers that stay with them for their entire careers. It
would not be an exaggeration to state that the Japanese social security system would
suffer if employers were not shouldering most of the burden for retirement benefits.
Given the high level of financial commitment on the part of employers, there is an
emphasis on long-term firm-specific training, and employers are highly sensitive to the
loss of human capital. Because of the conflict of such a system with the lifecycle of a
woman, a dual-track system has emerged in Japan, forcing women to a subordinate role
within the workplace.
The dual-track system has two components. First, there is the dekasegi, which
refers to a short-term labor pool of mostly women that can be expanded and contracted
in accordance with market demand. Workers in the dekasegi are not granted the same
benefits as regular workers. Then there is the shushin koyosei, regular workers that are
covered under the lifetime employment system. They are typically males, and once
hired by a firm, can reasonably expect to continue employment at that firm until
retirement. Strong traditional gender roles in Japan prohibit and discourage women
from undertaking a serious commitment to their jobs in the form of long hours and
geographic mobility. Therefore, women are delegated to clerical work with limited
possibility of promotion and wage increases. Women are ascribed to a behind-thescenes status with limited opportunities for firm-specific training (Jones, 1976).
Efforts to eliminate obstacles for women’s promotion and entry into career
tracks have been made. The Equal Employment Opportunity Law was passed in 1985
to eliminate blatant gender discrimination and provide means for redress. However, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Law did not prohibit discrimination, it only morally
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obliged employers to do the right thing. Furthermore, the law lacked any enforcement
powers; hence employers continued unfavorable practices and maintained
institutionalized gender discrimination in the workplace by continuously delegating
women to the inferior career-track of dekasegi (Lam, 1994).
Not only is the lifetime employment system problematic because it does not
permit women entry into the labor force as regular, full-time workers, it is also
problematic because it does not permit men the flexibility to reconcile work and family.
The strong belief that commitment to work should be demonstrated through long work
hours, geographical mobility, and socializing with coworkers outside of work prevents
men from taking an active role in childcare (Lam, 1994). By barring the entry of women
to many positions – in terms of occupation and positions within the firm, and depriving
men of the opportunity to combine work and family, the Japanese employment system
is institutionalizing traditional gender norms and further entrenching stereotypes that
prevent greater female labor force participation.
In order to encourage greater female labor market participation, Japan has to do
away with the lifetime employment system. Of course, this cannot be achieved
overnight, given the history of the system (lifetime employment system took place in
Japan immediately following the end of World War II and is widely considered to be a
driving force behind Japan’s economic growth in the years following the war). The
dismantling of the lifetime employment system will also cause distress to the social
security system at a time when the government does not have the means to support the
retirement of many workers (Tanaka, 1981). But incremental change can be introduced.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Law should be strengthened so that employers are
legally obligated to practice gender equal recruitment and hiring practices. Career
tracking – observing which careers men and women chose at the moment of hiring and
45

their progression through different positions within the firm – must be mandated across
the board, and standards for evaluating fair treatment of women must be established.
Finally, there should be an increased focus on the working hours of men as well.
Changing the work lives of men so that they can achieve greater work-life balance may
affect women’s propensity to work for pay by freeing up their time. Thus, it would be
advisable for Japan to introduce informal flexible work arrangements like the US and
Sweden so that schedules are tailored to the needs of particular employees and
industries. Providing women definite avenues for promotions and higher wages will
result in higher female labor force participation.
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4. Discussion
In this paper, I have attempted to conduct a comprehensive analysis of policies
affecting female labor force participation. The merit of this paper lies in the breadth of
policies covered – from family support policies to taxation and flexible working time
arrangements, most policies that directly affect female labor force participation have
been discussed. The paper also contributes to the literature through a comparison of
three countries. Comparison of Japanese policy with policies in the US and Sweden
elucidate the shortcomings of Japanese policy while providing clues as to how Japan
may be able to address legislation to fully utilize their labor force.
Nonetheless, the paper falls short of capturing the entire landscape. I have
purposefully focused on policy to uncover universal policy truisms that can boost
female labor force participation. I wanted to identify particular designs of policy, for
example, whether the length of parental leave was long enough or if the tax code
provided for marriage neutrality. However, policy does not exist in a vacuum. Social,
cultural and historical factors play heavily into the formulation of policy and determine
their effects once enacted. For a holistic and realistic picture of how Japanese policy
should be altered, cultural factors must be considered. Moreover, by pursuing breadth
in policy, I have sacrificed a certain degree of depth. Each of the three policy areas
covered in this paper – family support policy, taxation, and flexible working time
arrangements – merit their own in-depth analysis with greater technical precision. In
the future, it would be beneficial to incorporate a cultural comparison to provide context
to policies in the three countries.
Culture is an important part of female labor force participation in Japan. As such,
it would be useful to conduct another comparison, but this time with other Asian
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countries that share similar values but have different female labor force participation
rates and/or policy designs. For example, it would be enlightening to compare Japan
with Korea, a country close to my heart given my nationality and with striking
similarities in female labor force participation rates and trends. It would also be
informative to compare Japan with China or Singapore, both Asian countries with less
cultural similarities and higher female labor force participation rates.
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5. Conclusion
Japan is an anomaly among modern industrial nations in terms of the female
labor force participation rate. Despite an alarming ageing of the population and low
fertility rates, the country has failed to harness the human capital of well-educated
women, particularly mothers that left the labor force for the purpose of childbirth and
childrearing. Studies show that fertility rates and labor force participation rates are not
mutually exclusive, and that family support policies can boost both fertility and labor
force participation.
Based on a comprehensive analysis of policies affecting female labor force
participation in Japan, the US, and Sweden, the following conclusions can be drawn:
1. Japan’s family support policies are substantially generous compared to the
US, but fall short of Swedish policy. Japan can realize greater female labor
force participation by continuing to provide long parental leave and
alleviating financial concerns by increasing the replacement rate of income
during leave.
2. Japan’s taxation system is inherently marriage neutral. However, the
Allowances for Spouses and eligibility for the National Pension Plan reinforce
and institutionalize existing gender norms by subordinating wives as
dependents of husbands. Japan should eliminate such provisions and ensure
the integrity of marriage neutrality entailed by the system of individual
taxation.
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3. Japan should inject more flexibility in working arrangements by addressing
its lifetime employment system. As a starting point, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Law of 1985 should be strengthened with enforcement powers.
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has emphasized the need for structural reform and
has openly declared his commitment to increasing female labor force participation rates.
One hopes that Japan learns from other countries that have achieved a higher level of
gender equality to become an advanced country – both in terms of its economy and its
civil society.
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